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BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF GENETIC
DISCRIMINATION: OLD RESPONSES TO
NEW TECHNOLOGY
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
The subject of genetic discrimination is one of obvious importance
today, but it is one that I have reached only by a circuitous route. I pub-
lished my book Forbidden Grounds in 1992.' There I took the position
that current anti-discrimination laws should be repealed insofar as they
apply to private competitive employment markets.2 I relied on my liber-
tarian bent to explain why a system of free entry and open markets can
better cope with invidious forms of discrimination in employment mar-
kets than any system of government mandated and enforced norms.3
Prejudice in markets is always costly to the parties who practice it, so that
there is a strong corrective against unthinking prejudice that works with-
out the heavy administrative costs and logrolling mentality that often
infect the political decision-making process.4 But whatever the strength
of these arguments, there is today little chance that we shall depart from
our current destructive regulatory policies, and little chance, either, that
the underlying economics of the situation will improve.
The framework that I used to attack employment discrimination laws
does not rest on any categorical or a priori belief that government inter-
vention is always bad. Rather, it rests on the assumption that the valid
reasons for government intervention are: (1) to counter the use of private
aggression; (2) to limit the operation and influence of private monopolies;
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago. This paper was originally delivered as part of the Distinguished Lecture
Series at Boston University School of Law on September 22, 1993. An earlier version
of this paper was delivered at the Center for Medical Ethics, The University of
Chicago.
I RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
2 Id. at 495-505.
3 Id. at 290-96 (discussing whether employers may take cost-differentials associated
with race, sex, age, or disability into account in their decision making).
4 See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 22 (2d ed.
1971).
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and (3) to provide for classical public goods that cannot be supplied by a
network of contractual arrangements, given the risk of holdout and stra-
tegic bargaining. Ironically, though, any approach that emphasizes free-
dom in private choice also calls for sharp limitations on the scope of
government discretion, and, hence, more resistance to race-conscious
programs than current law exhibits.5
All this is by way of prologue, for I thought that these arguments,
whether sound or not, had been left behind when I decided to shift my
research interests to another disaster area-health care.6 I was, however,
rudely awakened to the ubiquity of certain problems when I was asked to
participate in a radio talk show devoted to the topic of genetic discrimina-
tion. It took only seconds for me to realize that this topic plunges us back
into the same set of issues on which I took such an unfashionable position
in Forbidden Grounds. The reason is clear enough to see.
I. DISCRIMINATION: THE INESCAPABLE ISSUE
Medical and scientific technology recently has made significant
advances in the field of genetic testing. These advances assist in the pre-
diction, diagnosis, and mitigation of disease.7 Techniques mapping cer-
tain diseases to specific sites in the human genome have already been
applied to diseases such as cystic fibrosis, Duchenne muscular dystrophy,
and Huntington's disease.' In the case of Huntington's disease, genetic
testing accurately predicts the future onset of the invariably lethal disease
and offers strong clues as to its severity and time of onset. Technology
has given us the ability to see written in the future what, up to now, has
been left to pure chance.
The advent of such genetic information creates the fear that this knowl-
edge will be turned against those with undesirable conditions. Put simply,
the question to be faced by society is whether the state, employers, and
insurers-to mention only the most prominent institutions-should be
5 See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 501-02; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING
WITH THE STATE (1993); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 323-24 (1985).
6 1 am currently writing a book-length study that explores the use and limits of
private markets in the health care realm. A tentative title for the book is Mortal Peril:
The Regulation and Reform of Health Care in the United States. For shorter pieces,
see Richard A. Epstein, Why Is Health Care Special?, 40 KAN. L. REV. 307 (1992);
Richard A. Epstein, Rationing Access to Medical Care: Some Sober Second Thoughts,
3 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 81 (1991).
7 See Marvin R. Natowicz et al., Genetic Discrimination and the Law, 50 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 465, 465 (1992) (discussing the social problems raised by advances in
technology).
8 Id. (discussing the specific techniques that allow detection of altered genes).
Other genetic defects include juvenile diabetes, Lesch-Nylan disease, sickle cell ane-
mia, phenylketonuria, and hemochromatosis.
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allowed to take into account genetically derived information that reveals
an individual's prospects for future disease and incapacity. This question
affects all sorts of human interaction: from employment and the purchase
of health, life, and disability insurance in the economic sphere, to the suit-
ability of potential adoptive parents in the personal sphere. This Lecture
will extend the analytic framework that I have applied to basic discrimi-
nation to encompass genetic discrimination.
The possibility that genetic information may be used at all creates the
possibility that it may be used badly. The long history of the eugenics
movement is evidence that the mere possession of information gives no
assurance that it will be used for wise ends.9 Similarly, it is possible to
misinterpret the results of IQ tests to the prejudice of intelligent persons
who do not, for example, have a working mastery of the English lan-
guage.' ° But whatever the difficulties with the eugenic movement, the
march of science makes it clear beyond argument that a wide number of
important disease conditions have a genetic base, which can be identified
by testing even before they manifest themselves." As stated above, the
question is whether this genetic information should be used, and if so by
whom, to make decisions in such contexts as jobs, insurance, and health.
For these purposes, genetic discrimination has been defined as "dis-
crimination directed against an individual or family based solely on an
apparent or perceived genetic variation from the 'normal' human geno-
type."' 2 This definition reaches the cases that I wish to discuss. The use
of the word "solely", however, may make this definition far too restrictive
if parallels to Title VII' 3 are accurate: It probably does not cover cases in
which genetic information is one source of discrimination mixed in with
others.
The dominant attitude today, as expressed both in legislation and judi-
cial decisions, is strongly hostile to genetic discrimination, which is
regarded as stigmatizing certain groups of individuals, and as playing into
the hands of those antisocial people who, from base prejudice, wish to
9 See STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 335-36 (1981) (criticizing
Justice Holmes's infamous "three generations of imbeciles are enough" statement in
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), and discussing the personal suffering of Doris
Buck because of her inability to conceive after her forced sterilization).
10 Id. at 146-233 (criticizing the entire testing movement). For a more balanced
account of the testing movement, see MARK SYNDERMAN & STANLEY ROTHMAN,
THE IQ CONTROVERSY: THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC POLICY 1-41 (1988) (tracing the
reasons for a rapid anti-testing consensus in the United States in the late 1960s and
throughout the 1970s).
11 See Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing,
50 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 476, 476 (1992) (stating that "the pace of development and
application of DNA and biochemical genetic tests ... may be accelerated").
12 See id. I will comment on the practice of placing quotation marks around the
word "normal" later in this paper. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
1994]
HeinOnline  -- 74 B.U. L. Rev. 3 1994
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
exclude and alienate deserving individuals from society. 14 So stated, the
question of genetic discrimination is a blend between the old and the
new. The technology creates new situations to which principled answers
must be provided. Yet, as is so often the case, the ultimate questions of
value and choice depend less on the dramatic innovations in technology
and more on the familiar inquiries into the relationship of individual to
individual, and of the state to its citizens. Novelty in circumstance does
not always require novelty in solution. Genetic discrimination provides
an ideal laboratory experiment in which old principles, rightly conceived,
supply the best answers to modern problems.
In one sense, this grand observation is congenial to persons on both
sides of the genetic discrimination debate. The dominant professional
response to genetic discrimination should come as no surprise, for intel-
lectual movements and attitudes are rarely compartmentalized by subject
matter or discipline. Attitudes on genetic testing are shaped by a familiar
Zeitgeist: a set of core beliefs that operate in society generally and else-
where in the law.
The grounds for state intervention that I mentioned above-externali-
ties and coordination-are surely not rejected in modern law and social
practice. However, that short list is oftentimes augmented by other
asserted grounds for intervention. Chief among these is the idea that
luck, either good or bad, should not be a reason for one person to lead a
better or worse life than others. The position of John Rawls that certain
attributes are morally arbitrary surely carries over to the situation of
genetic differences. 5 Many people do not believe that individuals own
their talents and abilities. Still more people believe that they should not
be burdened with bad luck in the genetic draw. When differences in luck
are attributable solely to external circumstances, this modern view holds
that something ought to be done to rectify the situation. That is, we must
equalize the positions of various individuals or groups, even if it means
(as it always does) that property, wealth, and opportunities must be taken
from one group of people and given to another.
There are of course many cases in which it is not clear whether bad
luck or bad conduct is the source of a disability. This distinction may not
matter-in the health care field, the extreme modern position is that all
are deserving of care "no matter what."' 6 So long as the individual posi-
tions are different, society should act to equalize these positions, without
14 Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic
and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 111 (1991).
15 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 506-12 (1971) (discussing the basis of
equality in systems of justice).
16 For one illustration, see Carl Cohen et al., Alcoholics and Liver Transplantation,
265 JAMA 1299, 1299 (1991) (pointing out that in numerous situations, care is pro-
vided despite the level of moral negligence of the injured party). But see Alvin H.
Moss & Mark Siegler, Should Alcoholics Compete Equally for Liver Transplantation?,
[Vol. 74:1
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regard to the individual or institutional choices that brought about the
initial disparity.
This general view offers fertile ground to support some general prohi-
bition against genetic discrimination. Some persons are born ugly and
others beautiful or smart or dumb. Oftentimes it is difficult to figure out
how one could intervene to offset these types of differences, given their
infinite gradations that are so difficult to identify and measure. But with
genetic defects, the differences involved are often discontinuous: A per-
son with a major genetic defect may suffer from juvenile diabetes, Lesch-
Nylan disease, Huntington's disease, sickle cell anemia, phenylketonuria
(PKU), or hemochromatosis. There are literally hundreds of unpro-
nounceable genetic conditions that may or will result in some impairment
of major life functions.
In some cases (as with PKU), knowledge of the existence of the condi-
tion can assist in the selection of a good diet, neutralizing the threat. In
other cases, such as Huntington's disease, the genetic trait may manifest
itself late in life. But when it does, it is invariably lethal after extended
periods of dementia and loss of bodily control. No wealth transfer to
victims of Huntington's disease could ever hope to equalize their posi-
tions in life. But some redistribution of wealth might bring about a mod-
est redress of the imbalance. On this perception I think that there is
consensus on both the conservative and liberal frontiers. For while liber-
als may well prefer a state solution and conservatives might prefer a vol-
untary one, no one thinks that this imbalance in natural fortunes justifies
a moral response of total indifference.
The key question, alluded to in what has been stated above, is this:
What kind of response is appropriate? One possible mode of response is
to reflexively invoke the anti-discrimination laws to deal with genetic dif-
ferences. But that response does not address the choice of means that
allows the more fortunate to help the less fortunate. Instead, this
approach forsakes the language of charity and embraces the language of
rights by holding that private parties must disregard in business settings
the same conditions, (i.e., impairments) that in informal social contexts
prompt a compassionate response. The anti-discrimination principle,
once said to reach its highest zenith on matters of race and sex, is now
carried over to the use of genetic information. Employers are not
allowed to take the handicaps of persons who suffer from various forms
of genetic deficits into account when making their personnel decisions.
Social work agencies cannot use this information to determine the fitness
of adoptive parents. There is today a groundswell of academic opinion, in
some instances translated into law, that genetic discrimination is a wrong
that in many contexts should be stamped out by the state with all the
265 JAMA 1295, 1296 (1991) (an eminently sensible position arguing that one reason
to deny alcoholics coverage is that their misbehavior renders them less deserving).
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resources at its disposal.17 Indeed, I am not aware of any serious discus-
sion of the issue that has a kind word to say for the employers and insur-
ers who are condemned for genetic discrimination. Does this opinion
make sense, or do the substantial costs of these proposals suggest the
adoption of a somewhat different approach to the problem?
At a theoretical level, the issue is what should be done to regulate the
flow of information that indicates that persons have, or are susceptible to,
certain kinds of genetic diseases. Even to state the problem in this fash-
ion marks one something of a conservative because it presupposes that a
disease entails conditions that ought to be avoided. One thus runs into
the teeth of the current wave of fashionable political theory that disease,
like everything else under the sun, is socially constructed, and carries with
it the risks of discrimination, stigmatization, and stereotyping. "What
words should we use, for example, to describe genetic variation? Defects,
flaws, deleterious genes, disorders, or the more neutral condition. Using
words such as normal-and its corollary, abnormal-is likely to foster
stigmatization and discrimination."'" Or so it has been said.
This exercise of political metaphor conceals more than it reveals. One
may not want to discriminate against persons with certain traits. How-
ever, it is absurd to argue that these traits are just as good as any other,
even if they turn out to be lethal, or cause enormous pain and suffering to
the persons who are (old style English again) afflicted with them. Surely
it does not make any sense in allocating resources for medical research to
treat people as though they are healthy when they are sick. For instance,
it would make little sense to treat the common cold as more serious than
breast cancer or AIDS. The rules on discrimination thus force us to parti-
tion our view of the world. When employer regulation is on the table, the
social response is that we cannot distinguish between good and bad
health save by dubious means of social construction. Yet, when public
17 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.7-1 (Michie Supp. 1993):
(1) No employer, employment agency or licensing agency shall directly or
indirectly:
(a) Request, require or administer a genetic test to any person as a condition
of employment or licensure.
(b) Affect the terms, conditions or privileges, of employment or licensure or
terminate the employment or licensure of any person who obtains a genetic test.
(2) No person may sell or interpret for an employer, employment agency, or
licensing agency a genetic test of a current or prospective employee or licensee.
Id. The remedies include actual and punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees,
and injunctive relief. Id. § 28-6.7-3.
18 Philip J. Boyle, Introduction to Genetic Grammar: 'Health,' 'Illness' and the
Human Genome Project, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP., July/Aug. 1992, at S1 (discussing
how the language used to describe genetic differences affects their social perception).
"Normal" was also placed within quotation marks in the definition of genetic discrim-
ination quoted from Billings et al., supra note 11, at 476. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
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support for disease is on the table, we now understand the natural world
holds out enormous perils to everyone in society.
Our view of disease, however, should depend on what disease is and
how it operates. It should not depend on the particular social purpose to
which knowledge is turned at any given moment. It should depend on
the evidence as to biological and social causation. The inescapable truth
is that an abnormal trait, such as the gene for Huntington's disease, is a
sign of fatal complications; it does not offer any hidden potential for per-
sonal gain.' 9
In this context it is often said that there is no connection between the
use of "normal" as a descriptive term and it use as a prescriptive one.
And as a matter of logic, no one can establish a logical or necessary con-
nection between a trait that is common in a population and a trait that is
desirable. But while the connection may not be necessary or logical, it is
surely contingent-that is, there is surely an empirical association that is
far from random. Most traits that reduce the fitness of an organism tend
to die out over time. Those traits that tend to advance an organism will
over time appear with greater frequency than those that do not. Thus, at
some level, an important link occurs between the "normal" of relative
frequency and the "normal" of normative discourse. The logic of natural
selection helps supply that connection. The willingness of people to pay
to avoid the pain and limitations of disease thus reflects biological drives
for survival and procreation that antedate our modern literary conscious-
ness. People may differ in their tolerance of pain and disease, but there
are few who treat it as a welcome benefit and not a condition to be
devoutly avoided. Therefore, when medical research funding is at stake
in the political arena, diseases are portrayed as insidious killers. Switch
the topic to discrimination, though, and they are neutral and faceless con-
ditions that belong in quotation marks, as if life under these disabilities is
no worse than life without them.
II. FROM IGNORANCE TO KNOWLEDGE
How then, with an issue so freighted, is it possible to approach genetic
discrimination from something of a distance? Rather than jump to the
question of legal intervention, it is useful to ask how ordinary individuals,
interested only in self-knowledge, would respond to the prospects of
acquiring information about their own genetic condition. Once that is
understood, we can ask about what happens under different legal regimes
when that information is shared or withheld during human dealings. This
19 See Stephen J. Post, Huntington's Disease: Prenatal Screening for Late Onset
Disease, 18 J. MED. ETHICS 75, 75-78 (1992) (arguing that late onset diseases, despite
the certainty of causing severe suffering, should not be automatic cases for abortion
when detected prenatally). "Few would quarrel with the assumption that it is prefera-
ble to have healthy children who are not born into severe or chronic pain." Id. at 76.
19941
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inquiry confirms an old insight about the use of information-its revela-
tion has consequences that are both allocative and distributive, both good
and bad. At one level, information eliminates major problems, for it
gives greater knowledge of the future and thus allows better use of scarce
resources. But at another level, it only adds to difficulties already pres-
ent, for its selective generation and use increases the possibility of mis-
chief from strategic behavior. The arrival of new technological
possibilities, such as genetic screening, neither alters the range of possible
outcomes, nor changes the legal principles that might weed out the bad
effects of information while preserving the good. Their arrival only
expands the arena in which these established principles must work.
It is helpful at the outset to consider whether any individual would
choose to avail himself of a costless and reliable test that pinpoints
whether he has a particular gene. The most mooted case in the literature
is the gene for Huntington's disease, which is especially apt for this dis-
cussion.2 ° The disease is caused by a single gene defect.2 ' Unlike most
terrible and fatal diseases, this gene is dominant (but with low frequency
in the general population) and survives across generations only because
the onset of the disease is typically after age thirty-five, thereby allowing
for successful reproduction.22 However, once the disease sets in, there is
a long period of degeneration of physical and mental capabilities, fol-
lowed by a painful death,23 leaving it as no accident that the suicide rate
of persons with Huntington's disease is far higher than for the normal
population.24
Consider first a world in which there is complete ignorance about the
transmission mechanism of the disease. Its occurrence is everywhere
regarded as an act of God, or what we would call a random event. The
correlation between parent and child remains undetected, and people
must organize their lives without any ability to identify who is at risk and
who is not. The only levels of preparation that are undertaken are those
appropriate for any random event such as being struck by a meteor. On
purely personal matters, everyone is in the same basic position. Similarly,
in the contractual and public arena, no state, employer, or insurer can
distinguish between one person and the next. The practical impossibility
20 For a description of the relevant medical information, see Gwen Terrenoire,
Huntington's Disease and the Ethics of Genetic Prediction, 18 J. MED. ETHICS, 79, 79-
85 (1992) (exploring the conclusions arrived at in the body of articles discussing the
ethics of testing for Huntington's disease).
21 Natalie Angier, Researchers Locate Gene That Triggers Huntington's Illness,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at Al (reporting the discovery of the culprit gene).
22 Terrenoire, supra note 20, at 79.
23 Id.
24 Peter Gorner, Out of the Shadow a New Genetic Test Can Foretell Agonizing
Death: Would You Take It?, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 4, 1988, at T1 (reporting a suicide rate
four to seven times the national average).
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of discrimination eliminates any need to respond to it socially. Ignorance
is bliss because the insurance markets instantaneously have all the private
information possessed by any of its players-precisely none. The case
thus folds into the class of events for which adverse selection is impossi-
ble. No special stipulations or conditions are appropriate.
Our own world has never really been like this completely ignorant one.
For a long period of time before the advent of genetic testing, people
realized that Huntington's disease was inheritable, and that if either par-
ent had the condition, the offspring had a fifty percent chance of having it
as well.25 Until genetic screening arrived, there was no way to tell prior
to manifestation who would escape the disease and who was inevitably
doomed to perish by it. Under the laws of Mendelian inheritance, a
known subclass of individuals at risk must make important decisions in
the face of critical uncertainty. These individuals must decide whether to
marry and have children, whether to invest in years of education or train-
ing, and whether to take out a home mortgage, all in basic ignorance of
their future fortunes. As planning must take into account two possible
and distinct future states of the world, the necessary choices are at best
unhappy compromises. Does one disclose to a potential marriage partner
the possibility of having the disease? Does one decide to have children if
one is a possible carrier of the disease? Does one abort an accidental
pregnancy? It takes precious little information to pose these sorts of
dilemmas for an individual-just enough to identify some persons at risk
and others not.
III. FROM KNOWLEDGE TO FRAUD
I do not pretend to have the answer to the above questions, but only
observe that the error costs are very high no matter which state of the
world comes to pass. To avoid marriage and children, only to turn out to
be free of the disease, is a cruel fate-even if it is preferable to having the
disease itself. More important for our purposes, the asymmetrical nature
of the information creates genuine problems for all types of routine inter-
personal relations. It seems clear to me that there is at the very least a
moral duty to disclose the potential risk to a possible spouse, given the
intimate nature of the relationship and the devastating consequences of
the information. Although there may be no statutory duties on potential
spouses, I suspect that a deceived spouse could dissolve (if not annul) a
marriage once the true condition came to light-assuming that other legal
or emotional factors did not intervene.
Furthermore, the nature of the dynamics changes rapidly in the setting
of impersonal institutional contracts. A person who knows that he is at
25 Sandra G. Boodman, Study Finds That Bad News Is Better Than Uncertainty,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 17, 1992 (Health), at 5 (noting that it has long been known that
offspring of afflicted parents have a 50% chance of inheriting the gene).
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risk for Huntington's disease has a strong incentive to acquire life and
health insurance for the condition. This is because the expected payoffs
are far greater than the stated premiums, which are based on the life
expectancy and health needs of ordinary persons. Once this asymmetry is
known to insurance companies, they have a counterincentive to equalize
the information so that they can either avoid the risk altogether or charge
a premium commensurate with its severity. By assumption, testing is not
an option open to companies-they must rely on contractual techniques.
They may inquire about family histories to discover the condition-the
dominant gene surely must have manifested itself numerous times in the
past. Or, they may quite simply exclude coverage for the disease and its
sequelae, obviating the problem of risk (as they do with suicide given the
evident moral hazard).
These insurance questions thus arise on the basis of any rudimentary
difference in knowledge. The possible doctrinal escape route-that non-
disclosure is no wrong-might in principle be available in personal set-
tings (although I doubt it), but, available or not, it is just not important in
this context. Companies, having been taken in the past, will adjust and
create standard form contracts that will ask future applicants pointed
questions, and force the applicant to lie in order to obtain coverage.
Should companies be allowed to protect themselves in this matter?
I postpone the analysis of this question to consider the third stage in
the progression: the modern period, when it is now possible to test for the
gene causing Huntington's disease.2" People at risk now have options
(and difficulties) brought on by the advent of knowtedge. Recent survey
results indicate that most people at risk think that they would like to
know about the outcome, and I must say from a merciful distance that
such is the choice that I would take. Uncertainty places enormous bur-
dens on all at-risk individuals, including those who are actually free of the
disease. But with a perfect and costless test, fifty percent of the at-risk
people will have a great weight lifted from their shoulders and will be
able to lead normal lives from that point on. And what of the fifty per-
cent who receive a death warrant? First note that the test does not cause
the disease; it only delivers the bad message. Yet that message is not all
bad. With knowledge of the certain eventual onset of the disease in hand,
extensive planning may be done-even absent information about the
exact date of onset.2" It is easier to make career and marriage choices;
easier to know what kind of house to buy, where to live, and what to do.
On balance certain knowledge may be worse than fifty percent knowl-
edge because it replaces uncertainty with despair, but from an ex ante
26 Gorner, supra note 24, at T1.
27 Boodman, supra note 25, at 1.
28 Recent scientific research, however, suggests that it may be possible to predict
the future age of disease onset by closely observing the abnormal expansion of the
Huntington's gene. Angier, supra note 21, at Al.
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perspective this loss is more than offset by the enormous relief of a nega-
tive test. With costless tests and perfect information, individuals are
likely to test for their own sake, even without the possibility of using that
information against employers, insurers, or other institutional defendants.
In practice, the number of persons who actually take the Huntington's
test is said to be smaller than surveys predict-but that result is not
inconsistent with the general analysis here. The test itself is quite costly,
averaging about $5000;29 it often requires (or at least required) participa-
tion of other family members. The result itself is generally reliable, but
there are marginal risks of both false negatives and false positives. 30 A
negative result does not absolutely guarantee a clean bill of health. So
long as the probabilities only shift, all the questions of planning for a
dichotomous world remain, and the gains themselves evaporate at least
for individual decisions. The likely result is that people would utilize an
imperfect Huntington's disease prediction test only infrequently-if per-
sonal matters of lifestyle were all that turned on the result.
But now let us postulate that in other settings allocative and distribu-
tional consequences will arise. As explained earlier, knowledge of Hunt-
ington's disease does nothing to alter its time of onset or its anticipated
severity. But with other genetically related diseases, such as PKU and
diabetes, knowledge of the condition can have a marked effect in reduc-
ing both these risks. In these particular cases, the only question that peo-
ple have to ask is whether the costs of the genetic test are worth the
benefits that it generates. As with Huntington's disease, the highest
payoffs are, of course, with guaranteed results, but even a shift in the
odds will make a significant difference. The greater the likelihood that
someone is prone to the disease, the more inclined that person will be to
make changes in lifestyle and diet that will head the disease off. A shift
in the odds can be matched with a shift in individual behavior that results
in strong positive gains.
That knowledge prompts a distributional question that comes close to
the nub of the insurance and discrimination question: Must the person
disclose the information to other parties? I think that in the case of
Huntington's disease it is immoral for a person to marry (or even take a
job) and conceal the condition from the potential spouse or employer.
This conclusion is valid in commercial settings as well as in marital ones
so long as the concealment results in selective knowledge to one side that
is denied to the other. When an individual has knowledge that he is at
risk of incapacitation, perhaps from family history, then full disclosure
should be the norm. When the individual knows to a certainty that he is a
29 Judy Berlfein, Genetic Testing: Health Care Trap, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1990, at
B2 (reporting average testing costs).
30 See Nancy Ross-Flanigan, Progress Reported on Disorder; U-M Team Helps
Find Huntington's Gene, DET. FREE PRESS, Mar. 24, 1993, at B2 (noting that the test
is 98% accurate and requires samples from relatives).
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carrier of the trait, from a reliable genetic test, the same is true. The
principle does not change; all that changes is the information that must be
disclosed.
Yet there is at least this practical difference in the latter disclosure situ-
ation: Parties who have a need for certainty, like insurers, need not rely
on medical histories and coverage exclusions to protect themselves. They
can demand the right to administer and interpret the genetic tests them-
selves. They have the incentive to get the right result, for they gain little
by turning away a healthy person whose parent has been affected by the
disease. (Irrationality is a convenient crutch, but not one that explains
stable market behavior.) This method of self-protection is more effective,
and more intrusive. The question is whether the law should allow it to be
available.
At this point it is critical to note that the plea for privacy is often a plea
for the right to misrepresent one's self to the rest of the world." In and
of itself that may not be a bad thing. We are certainly not obligated to
disclose all of our embarrassing past to persons in ordinary social conver-
sations; and it is certainly acceptable to use long sleeves to cover an ugly
scar. White lies are part of the glue that makes human interaction possi-
ble without shame and loss of face. Strictly speaking, people may be
deceived, but they are rarely hurt, and they may even be relieved to be
spared an awkward encounter. However, when a major change in per-
sonal or financial status is contemplated by another party, the white lies
that make human interaction possible turn into frauds of a somewhat
deeper dye. In order to see why this is the case, recall that the traditional
tort of misrepresentation stressed the usual five fingers: a false statement,
known to be false, material to the listener, and relied on, to the listener's
detriment. There is little question, whether we deal with marriage or with
business, that concealment of relevant genetic information satisfies each
element. The only question, therefore, is whether one can justify what is
a prima facie wrong.
I am hard pressed to see what that justification might be. No doubt the
individual who engages in this type of deception has much to gain. But
equally there can be no doubt that this gain exists in all garden variety
cases of fraud as well. To show the advantage of the fraud to the party
who commits it is hardly to excuse or to justify it, for the same can be said
of all cases of successful wrongs. On the other side of the transaction,
there is a pronounced loss from not knowing the information when key
decisions have to be made. For example, a woman may choose the wrong
husband; an employer may pass up a good employee with a strong medi-
cal record and a clear upward path in favor of a worker who will, in the
end, be the source of enormous personal and financial costs. To show
that the condition is one for which the speaker is not responsible hardly
31 See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12
GA. L. REV. 455 (1978).
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justifies concealment at all: Lying about one's age or about the place of
one's birth is often fraud even though these facts are immutable-just ask
the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
False statements about or deliberate concealment of genetic informa-
tion is as much a fraud as false statements about or concealment of any
other issue. The only possible justification for concealment, therefore,
would be that it is unfair for the person with the pending disorder to deal
alone with the suffering and financial loss. Yet, that loss is not sustained
because of the wrong of another. Could the victim of a natural catastro-
phe keep it secret, and single out one other person to bear some substan-
tial fraction of the loss? If not, then why give that same privilege to the
victim of a genetic defect? Today, it is easy to find strong support for
socializing losses. But why should .a person laboring under a genetic
defect be entitled to pick the person or group that has to pay the subsidy?
In sum, genetic discrimination raises problems no different from those
associated with any other sort of misfortune, and calls for no different
response. The greater knowledge that comes from testing increases the
informational asymmetries that are always the bane of insurance markets.
When testing is possible, dangers from strategic behavior are only
enhanced. Accordingly, the case for insisting on standard insurance
norms is greater than it was before. Full disclosure of material informa-
tion in response to direct questions is an indispensable part of that sys-
tem. If we have reason to suspect that a system of disclosure could prove
unreliable, we should allow the employer or insurer to test in order to
obtain the knowledge already available to the employee. The person who
wants privacy need not apply for the position or the insurance coverage.
But he should not be able to have it both ways, and at someone else's
expense.
IV. KEEPING IT DARK UNDER THE ADA
Currently, our policy as a country is precisely the opposite. The situa-
tion is a variation of the policy "don't ask, don't tell," or, more accurately
for this case, "can't ask, don't tell." This surely is the position with
respect to disabilities that are now covered by the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA). 2 The only uncertainty for this analysis is whether a
genetic trait that has not manifested itself counts as a disability within the
meaning of the statute-a point on which the drafting of the statute is
unclear, but on which the ultimate outcome is not.33
It is still not certain whether an employee can blurt out the information
that he has a clean bill of health. The problem here is no different from
one in which a woman voluntarily tells her prospective employer that she
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991); see Gostin, supra note 14, at 122-23.
33 See Gostin, supra note 14, at 124-27; Natowicz et ai., supra note 7, at 470.
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does not want children, or is sterile.34 If the voluntary disclosure legal
regime carries over to the ADA, then volunteers may still take the initia-
tive to bring their healthy condition to the attention of an employer or an
insurer. If they do so, then all others must follow suit in order to prevent
the possibility of discrimination, for otherwise their silence becomes deaf-
ening. So again the system works best only when people with disabilities
are authorized to lie with impunity, just as they are allowed to remain
silent with impunity. The legal regime actually evolves into, "can't ask,
may tell, may lie." This policy is the inevitable result of our attempts to
regulate information. Along the road, truth is discouraged and lies are
protected, promoted, and necessary. Once the anti-discrimination norm
becomes dominant, the older norms against force and particularly fraud
must necessarily give way. Here as elsewhere the recognition of positive
rights destroys negative liberties.
In practice, the situation is still more complicated when lies and con-
cealment are not in a person's self-interest. A prospective employee, for
example, might not want to deny an employer complete access to infor-
mation. Instead, he may only want selective restrictions. The ADA rec-
ognizes that dichotomy and contains extensive provisions to deal with
permissible uses of medical information.35 On the one hand, the ADA
strives to make sure that medical information is available for diagnosis
and treatment;36 on the other, it precludes the use of that information in
any initial hiring decision.37 Undoubtedly, if the ADA applies to genetic
discrimination for carrier or nonmanifested traits, these would be subject
to the same legal regime. 38
Under its basic approach, the ADA limits access to information that
can be elicited by ordinary inquiries and by medical examination. Under
ordinary circumstances outside of a medical setting, a job applicant can-
not be asked if he suffers from a disability. 39 He can be asked whether he
can perform job-related functions.40 As it stands now, if the answer is no,
it is not clear whether the ADA permits an employer to ask the reason
why. A person giving a reference for an applicant faces the same
dilemma: If the answer to the potential employer's question is that the
person cannot perform the job because he or she labors under a disabil-
ity, then the person asked for a reference must not answer. Yet as that
evasion itself pinpoints the reason for poor performance (but not the par-
ticular nature of the disability), the employer will have all the information
that he needs to look elsewhere for employees (without, of course, noting
34 See Gostin, supra note 14, at 140.
35 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1)-(4).
36 Id. § 12112(d)(3).
37 Id. § 12112(d)(2).
38 Id. § 12112(d).
39 Id. § 12112(d)(2)(A).
40 Id. § 12112(d)(2)(B).
[Vol. 74:1
HeinOnline  -- 74 B.U. L. Rev. 14 1994
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
the reasons for the shift in focus on the paper record). Once again, the
question is whether a person asked for a reference is entitled to lie in
order to conceal the source of the poor performance, or indeed to lie on
the question of whether prior performance was poor at all. Also, will the
reference be motivated to lie in order to protect one friend, or to tell the
truth in order to protect another? Neither of these choices seems at all
appetizing, so perhaps the reference will decide that the best strategy is to
simply refuse to answer any inquiries about potential employees. If this is
so, capable employees will be left without an important method of per-
suading prospective employers of their skill. Handicapped employees
who have done well in particular contexts may find it harder to show that
they pose less of a liability than a potential employer might suppose.
The regulation of information has undesirable ripple effects; it is not
easy to contain the side effects of a regime that authorizes partial con-
cealment. The task of getting information about applicants is surely
made more complex for the able and disabled alike. We know that the
murky line that separates nondisclosure from concealment and fraud will
be crossed; we can only guess how often and when.
The rules for using medical information once an employee is hired are
also quite elaborate, for they reflect the same overall desire to allow the
information to be collected and used, but only for the applicant's benefit.
Thus, no medical examination can be made prior to the time that an offer
is extended.4' Thereafter, one may be required-but only if two condi-
tions are satisfied.
First, the examination has to be conducted on all employees, if it is to
be conducted on any.42 it seems as though one must drill where oil can-
not be found in order to drill where oil might be (and, of course, drill with
the same equipment and at the same expense). The nondiscrimination
provision thus satisfies the legal but not the economic definition of dis-
crimination. All employees must be treated alike, but the value of testing.
in some cases is far greater than in others. Yet the puzzle remains. Why
is this constraint placed on an employer if the information acquired may
only be put to limited use under the statute? The employer's limited abil-
ity to use the information combined with the high cost of testing will lead
some firms to eliminate examinations altogether. Other firms may con-
tinue to use them but with less effectiveness than before.
Second, the ADA now requires that any information gleaned from an
examination be placed in a confidential file.43 Thereafter, the only per-
missible uses of the information are: (1) to inform managers of necessary
restrictions on the types of permissible work;4" and (2) to inform safety
41 Id. § 12112(d)(2)(A).
42 Id. § 12112(d)(3)(A).
43 Id. § 12112(d)(3)(B).
44 Id. § 12112(d)(3)(B)(i).
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personnel if the disability might require emergency treatment. 45 Other-
wise the information cannot be used at all, especially on matters of job
assignment, promotion, and transfer.46 The intention here is to separate
the beneficial from the distributional uses of the information, by allowing
the former and excluding the latter. Yet this law can only have partial
success. Clearly, certain disabilities cannot be disguised, such as confine-
ment to a wheelchair or deafness. Even if the disability is latent, as is the
case with persons who will eventually suffer from Huntington's disease,
no set of administrative procedures can completely prevent employers
from using this information for disallowed purposes once they possess it.
The best that might be done for employees is to invoke the ubiquitous
doctrines of "pretext" to counter hidden, rearguard campaigns by
employers who seek to use medical information in ways not allowed by
the ADA.47  Notwithstanding the protective provisions of the ADA, I
suspect that few workers whose conditions are latent will want the infor-
mation about genetic traits to be revealed or discovered-given the ques-
tions of practical enforcement that surely remain. Workers can be
expected to keep the information dark as long as they can, and employers
can be expected to use surreptitious techniques to ferret it out.
The ADA's system of partial disclosure has two further consequences
that bear mention. First, it costs a great deal of money to enforce pre-
cisely because the regulated information is so valuable to the employer
who is systematically denied access to it. Second, no firm will remain idle
simply because the law denies it access to the relevant information.
Instead, firms will adopt other strategies to cut their losses in a world that
regards concealment as a employee birthright.
One trend that we should anticipate is a gradual movement toward
higher wage and higher salaried workers. Offering these higher wages
and salaries should allow the employer to be more selective in the work-
ers hired, and one implicit criterion for employer selection will be the
health of the hired workers: the better the health, the lower the costs of
complying with government mandates on genetic discrimination as on all
other aspects of health care. In addition, the total number of workers
needed should be reduced as average worker fitness rises, and this in turn
will further reduce the employer's overhead on health costs.
45 Id. § 12112(d)(3)(B)(ii).
46 Id. § 12112(d)(3)(C).
47 For the origin of the pretext doctrine, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (holding that an employee should "be afforded a fair oppor-
tunity to show that [the employer's] stated reason for [the employee's] rejection was
in fact pretext"). For a recent change in pretext doctrine, see St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2753-54 (1993) (holding that even if pretext has been estab-
lished, the plaintiff has the burden of proving intentional discrimination by the
employer).
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The pressures for the selection of workers will not only exert them-
selves on the number and quality of workers hired. They should also spill
over to influence prior decisions concerning such matters as the location
of plants and offices.4" The out-migration of business to the suburbs is in
part driven by the desire to control the cost of labor. If workers in the
inner city present greater health problems, then the costs of mandates
will be greater for them than they are for workers who come from other
locales. Businesses that locate in suburban locations, therefore, will find
their relative advantages increased, and should be expected to expand
relative to those who remain in the inner city. It does not matter that
firms cannot foresee these possibilities when the various enactments are
passed. It is enough that they learn of them before they must make their
business decisions.
Additionally, the shift from employee to independent contractor
should intensify. The independent contractor works on a short term basis
for so many different employers that it is difficult for any one employer to
bear the full burdens of the welfare state. Thus, the independent contrac-
tor pays his own social security and medical insurance costs. 49 The
decline in the traditional employment relationship will of course carry in
its wake many individuals who are good risks for insurance pools, but
who are excluded because they are not allowed to warrant their position.
But no hard-pressed employer can be asked to take those consequences
into account. Workers will be shed at the cost of some organizational
efficiency in order to deflect a greater regulatory burden.
For those workers who do remain on an employer's payroll, we should
likewise expect to see some downsizing in the set of "neutral" medical
packages that are offered, and some reduction in wages (or smaller
increases) to offset the mandated costs. The great risk with insuring disa-
bilities is that they will impose enormous costs in individual cases. Plans
will be tailored to increase copayments and deductibles, and most impor-
tantly, to place sharper limits on the amount of catastrophic coverage that
is available. The costs of these shifts will be borne in part by the
employer (who cannot make the most efficient offer) and in part by other
workers (who would get these benefits if employers could exclude per-
sons with genetic risks and other latent conditions from the coverage
within the pool). Finally, as the price of labor increases relative to that of
equipment, employers will shift investments in human capital to invest-
ments in machinery.
48 See generally James Daly, To the Boondocks, FORBES, June 7, 1993, at 90
(reporting on the exodus of computer data centers to the suburbs); Barbara Vobejda,
Critical Condition: The State of America's Cities, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1993, at Al
(reporting on the "ills" of the inner city).
49 See 41 AM. JUR. 2D Independent Contractors §§ 21-22 (1968) (discussing the dis-
tinctions between an employee and an independent contractor).
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At this point, the prohibition against genetic discrimination should be
seen for what it is-an elaborate set of cross-subsidies that reduces the
total level of social wealth as it transfers wealth between parties. The
defenders of the ADA present their laws of redistribution as all gain and
no pain. Would that it were so.
V. IRRATIONALITY AND REGULATION
The above account delineates the range of responses that rational
employers and workers will adopt to the ADA legal regime. However,
one common justification for regulation is the irrationality of employers
and workers in their private activities. In particular, employers need to
be prodded into doing the right thing by a state whose own officials seem
to escape the occupational diseases that so afflict private firms. At the
most general level, this assertion of employer irrationality has it all back-
wards. Individual employers driven by concerns of profit and loss are
much more likely to rationally anticipate and control adverse conse-
quences than government bureaucrats who cannot capture any portion of
the gain from useful decisions, nor be made to suffer any portion of the
loss from silly or mischievous ones.
Furthermore, similar claims that regulation would prevent irrational
forms of sex discrimination have been unfounded.5 ° Instead, anti-dis-
crimination principles have forced employers to behave irrationally by
requiring them to ignore the known cost differentials of employing cer-
tain groups.5' The ADA regulations affecting the flow of genetic infor-
mation create the same irrationality.
Employers have no incentive to discriminate against workers whose
genetic conditions do not impose any cost, present or future, against
them. Insurers have no incentive to discriminate against applicants
whose genetic conditions pose no future risk. But both of these groups
do have strong incentives to discriminate against parties who do pose
greater risks. Efforts to keep genetic information secret do not make
sense because employers or insurers are irrational. They make sense pre-
cisely because both groups are rational: If privy to information, employ-
ers and insurers will act to advance their own interests and blunt the
implicit cross-subsidies that anti-discrimination laws attempt to create.
Nonetheless, it is often said that it is possible to collect empirical evi-
dence that employers and insurers overreact to positive results on genetic
tests and thus unfairly act towards individuals who do not pose any addi-
tional burden. One study provides self-selected cases in which asymp-
50 See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 283-312 (discussing how the narrow interpretation
of the exception to sex discrimination regulations (bona fide occupational qualifica-
tions) has resulted in unsound decisions that harm both employers and employees,
whether male or female).
51 Id. at 291-97 (discussing how the law "disregards those factors most relevant to
the operation of a sensible market").
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tomatic individuals or carriers were denied employment, insurance, or
permission to become adoptive parents because of their condition. 52
However, neither the frequency of these incidents nor the possible justifi-
cation for them has been determined.
If a person is a carrier of a deleterious gene, and the person's offspring
are covered under a proposed insurance contract, a decision by the
insurer not to cover is not irrational, given the greater costs that are
imposed. If the worker thinks that the risk in question is small, then he
probably could (if there were no regulations on the subject) get the
desired insurance for unrelated conditions-so long as he is willing to
waive coverage for himself (or family members) of the specified genetic
condition.
In other contexts, it also seems wholly inappropriate to ignore genetic
information. The Billings study included the case of a thirty-one year old
woman who was denied the opportunity to seek adoption solely because
she was at risk for Huntington's disease. How could anyone seriously
protest the decision of the adoption agency? Adoption is not a short-
term arrangement, but lasts as long as all shall live. Public authorities
would be remiss in placing a child in the hands of a parent, however con-
scientious, who has a fifty (let alone one hundred) percent chance of
becoming severely disabled at some point in the future. Such an outcome
would have a grievous impact on any child. Of course, some dreadful
outcome could occur in any adoption-a parent could be run over by a
truck or contract a deadly disease from a flu shot. But from an ex ante
perspective all that one can expect is to play the odds. A fifty percent
chance of a cataclysmic outcome is too great a risk to bear.
The adoption agency, like the employer or insurer discussed above,
acted in a rational manner. I doubt very much that any such applicant
could survive full disclosure, given the number of other prospective par-
ents ready, able, and willing to adopt. The adoption situation is an
instance in which testing should be required as soon as a potential parent
mentions a serious genetic defect. Additionally, serious criminal sanc-
tions should be imposed on anyone who misrepresents his health status
on an issue of this importance. Here, we should not allow charges of
"genetic discrimination" to obscure the sensible conslusion that the deci-
sion is justified in order to protect innocent children from serious psycho-
logical harms.
VI. SOCIAL RESPONSES TO GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
It is now useful to consider what alternative proposals should deal with
the question of genetic discrimination. I have already indicated why I
52 Billings et al., supra note 11, at 478 (reporting the findings of a pilot study on
genetic discrimination in which 29 respondents reported 41 incidents: 32 involved
insurance, 7 involved employment, and 2 involved adoption).
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think it is inappropriate to use a system of one-on-one corrective justice
to organize the social response to the use of genetic information. That
response works well when there is one wrongdoer and one victim. It
works far less well when there is an actual victim but no wrongdoer. At
that point, one must leave the familiar bipolar arrangements of litigation
and explore alternatives that prevent individuals from covertly singling
out their own providers.
The first of these alternative responses is probably the best one: do
nothing collectively at all, at least through the government. Today enor-
mous charitable efforts are made on behalf of the handicapped. These
should be continued, with or without the charitable deductions of our tax
scheme. In addition, technical innovation (made easier in a world with
open markets) can produce new workplace equipment that will assist dis-
abled workers to assume more productive lives.5" Such technology will
enable certain firms to specialize in hiring handicapped workers. Large
firms in certain industries may find it difficult to make these commit-
ments. But the potential for significant gains should prompt some firms
to specialize in this market niche. Firms entering this market would prob-
ably be able to provide facilities suitable for workers with certain handi-
caps at a low capital cost. These firms will not have to make extensive
renovations to their existing facilities in order to be fully accessible to
disabled persons. Specialization can further reduce these firms' cost of
accommodation by spreading the cost over a large number of workers.
Unfortunately, none of these innovations are of immediate benefit to per-
sons who are at risk to genetic diseases and disorders. However, once
established, these institutions will be available to these persons when
needed. There is nothing dramatic to this approach. It merely entails a
steady expansion of opportunities without government intervention
(which, in its effort to equalize wages and opportunities, is far more likely
to lower them across the board).
Whatever its quiet virtues, it is painfully clear that the approach of
benign nonintervention cannot weather the political abuse it is likely to
invite. Individual tales of hardship and woe can be trotted out in great
profusion to show a lack of compassion in the face of obvious need (a
need-it will not be mentioned-that always grows when there is a gov-
ernment program to satisfy it). Thus, it is politically necessary to contem-
plate another alternative response to genetic discrimination that still
avoids the one-on-one patterns of litigation and subsidy of the ADA. The
correct response here should be the same one that is required whenever
the social choice is between overt and covert subsidies. The subsidies
must be made overt, and they must be in the form of direct charges
53 See Susan Moran, Virtual Reality Moves Beyond Video Games to Help Disabled,
REUTERS, Nov. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (reporting that
new computer technology that should enable more disabled workers to work at high
tech jobs).
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against the public purse. Specifically, the government should fund the
additional costs associated with hiring or insuring individuals with genetic
defects. If that cost is $10,000 per year, and the cost of hiring or insuring
ordinary workers is $1,000 per year, then the government should fund the
$9,000 difference from general revenues. Only in this manner will the full
costs involved here be brought to the public consciousness, so that honest
choices may be made.
There may appear to be little difference between this system of explicit
subsidies and a universal requirement to hire or insure all persons regard-
less of their genetic defects. Both the subsidy tax and the anti-discrimina-
tion norm are uniform in their application: Since no one escapes the costs
in either setting, it is only a matter of style or esthetics to prefer the tax
route over the anti-discrimination route. However, this objection ignores
three critical differences.
First, the anti-discrimination laws certainly cannot guarantee that social
burdens will be distributed uniformly over society. If workers with
genetic defects tend to gravitate towards certain industries, professions,
or geographic regions, then however neutral the anti-discrimination
approach appears on its face, it will be heavily disproportionate in its
impact. Individuals will still retain private knowledge of their physical
condition, which they need not disclose in order to move into positions
that best minimize their associated health risks. As long as individual job
or insurance selection is at work, some skewed distribution of the social
costs of this system are assured. The rational actions of individuals will
not equalize the burdens on potential employers; they will skew them
further. Only a system of taxation and grants would equalize the burdens
on the public at large.
Second, the use of the anti-discrimination law is likely to increase the
total amount of expenditures for dealing with genetic discrimination
beyond what they would be with a system of taxes and subsidies. When
the costs of employing genetically defective workers is not made explicit,
it becomes extremely difficult to resist new initiatives to aid the disabled,
no matter how costly and ineffective the ones presently in place. The
entire language of individual rights effectively works to conceal relevant
budget constraints. The tendency is to consider each set of rights in isola-
tion from the next, even though each set competes for the same set of
limited resources. Placing the subsidy in plain view through an explicit
tax forces tradeoffs earlier in the process. Once these conflicts are visible
and realized, the aggregate commitment is likely to be reduced.
Although that outcome might not please advocates of the disabled, it
should please those who have a more disinterested view of proper social
decision making; that is, those who think that the commitment to eradi-
cate genetic discrimination can be too large as well as too small.
Third, the anti-discrimination approach often leads to the adoption of
general and neutral rules that are inefficient for the firm and society at
large. Thus, it is sometimes said that it is better to make conditions safe
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for all workers than to select workers for certain kinds of dangerous
employment in particular environments.54 Elaine Draper defends this
view when she writes: "Priorities in health policy could be redirected
toward reducing disease without needlessly penalizing individuals and
groups perceived to be genetically at high risk. For example, reducing
exposure hazards through engineering controls on chemical emissions can
make the workplace safer for everyone."55
Unfortunately, Draper's nondiscrimination approach contains no cost
function, for it ignores the social losses that are generated by the higher
capital expenditures that could be averted if only certain workers were
hired for particular tasks. It is not the case that selective policy "need-
lessly" penalizes individuals in the at-risk category. To see why that dis-
crimination is likely to have social benefits, suppose that it takes
$1,000,000 to change the equipment so that any person could work, say,
in a battery plant with an appreciable risk of lead poisoning. If five hun-
dred workers are needed in the plant, then the average cost per worker of
the improvements is $2000. Suppose for one group of workers the gains
from these improvements are equal to only $1000 per worker, while for a
second group of workers, equal in number to the first, the gains from
these improvements are $10,000 per worker. If workers are randomly
chosen, then the proposed capital improvement makes sense because the
$1,000,000 cost is lower than the losses averted: (250 x $10,000) + (250 x
$1000) = $2,750,000. But if worker selection is possible, the expenditure
does not make sense for the anticipated gains are only 500 x $1000 =
$500,000, when only the low risk workers are chosen. It is far better,
therefore, to select one group of workers and avoid the expenditure.
Indeed, it might be possible to improve the situation further by some less
expensive innovation that is cost justified for this restricted pool of
workers.
The more general point also bears noting. A firm that is free to vary
either capital equipment or worker mix will always do as well or better
than the firm that is constrained on the second variable. Within the firm,
rules that ignore relevant information will rarely do better than those that
take that information into account. Over and over again the economics
literature points out the difficulties that arise when parties have to make
joint decisions on the basis of imperfect and asymmetrical information.
A sound system of law should allow parties to eliminate both forms of
bias in making their decisions. The present attack on genetic discrimina-
tion only exacerbates these problems.
54 See, e.g., Elaine Draper, Genetic Secrets: Social Issues of Medical Screening in a
Genetic Age, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP., July/Aug. 1992, at S15.
55 Id. at S17.
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CONCLUSION
The difficulties attending general anti-discrimination law repeat them-
selves in the novel context of genetic discrimination. The basic approach
to discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is to trans-
form contracting in employment markets. But once the absolute right to
refuse employment or insurance is denied, win/win is no longer the antici-
pated outcome of any forced relationship. One party, the member of the
protected class, is entitled to demand that others treat him as though the
extra costs imposed under contract do not exist at all. Cases that are
strongly different from a business point of view are treated as similar by
legal fiat.
The consequences of this approach are both regrettable and predict-
able. When win/lose relationships are required by law, the designated
loser has numerous incentives to avoid persons in the protected class.
Thus, the level of discrimination actually increases-prompting calls for
still more government intervention to combat it. What emerges is a cycle
of regulation, evasion, and re-regulation with no obvious stopping point.
Even so, today's dominant mode of analysis does not pay so much as a
passing nod to the lessons of contracting economics or the logic of public
choice. Instead, there is an eager willingness to assume that these situa-
tions involve only matters of fairness, and that the situations can be satis-
fied without taking into account the hidden costs that anti-discrimination
policies impose on employers, workers, consumers, and suppliers. Need-
less to say, any serious questions as to how these policies affect the rate of
firm formation, the choice of business projects, and the shift from the
employment relationship to independent contracting, are simply not
regarded as part and parcel of the overall picture. Similarly, the possibil-
ity that the choice of policies might influence the accident or disease rate,
and the level of precaution that workers or others might take, is generally
overlooked or belittled. When the question of loss prevention is
addressed, there is a powerful bias in favor of general and neutral precau-
tions, even when these turn out to be far more expensive than selecting
suitable workers for particular environments. Dubious arguments are
repeatedly used to conceal the allocative dislocations brought on by the
system of anti-discrimination regulation. The issues raised by the
advance of genetic knowledge fall into the same pattern. The unvar-
nished good that comes from the ability to understand and control dis-
ease is something we should all welcome. Even so, advances made by
genetic testing should not be frittered away by a resort to the ever-coer-
cive, ever-expanding application of the anti-discrimination norm.
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